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THE FORMS OF INFORMATIVE INTERVENTIONS

from Yugoslavia to the virtual
wars of the 21st century

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Security Sector Reform and the Media

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The Yugoslav crisis begins at the time when historical myths empirically unknown to us stylize with the help of the media into a national event with one part of the population clearly recognizing the other as the enemy. This means war is about to break out. There are wars in the geographical area of the Balkans waged over the territories and borders. They break out as the wars of symbols and words. It is only a Greek – Macedonian dispute over the name and the national flag of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that haven't led to one more Balkan war.

It is the Yugoslav crisis that paved the way for the wars of the future, especially the 1999 clashes between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when NATO, a military and political alliance that became a media company with its PR management and information – making centers. Besides “humanitarian interventions” justified through general phrases on the protection of international piece, ethic relations and human rights, so called “informative interventions” are activated.

“The informative interventions” can be defined as “the domination of political over professional journalism guidelines”. The informative interventions become the first and the last asset to “humanitarian interventions” for it is the public they initially spur, shape it in line with the goals of the military and political, chiefly intelligence powers of a country, and then, once the goal has been reached, they analyze and estimate the results predominantly hushing up all the bad and detrimental things flowing from the “humanitarian interventions” including war crimes, pollution, use of dangerous armaments and above all the destruction of state sovereignty, governments and political regimes, which are defined as the disturbing factor of world and regional safety.

Reinforcing the strategic goals of the “informative and humanitarian interventions” is achieved by means of a global propaganda using all the permissible and unprofessional methods. Propaganda (of a known or unknown source) is used to strengthen a government's attitude or intents in a move to act in military, humanitarian or preventive conditions. In that context we may speak of a few types of propagandas and psychological manipulations (aggressive and regressive). It is an organized activity, complex work on spreading certain ideas and understanding aimed at changing the different ideas, attitudes and understandings of an individual or nation.

This is where PR agencies play an important role representing the interests of a subject of international relations and dealing with propaganda to the extent set. Today there are about a hundred agencies of the kind. Experts on media and crisis communication recognized in it an informative revolution and the art of «spin-doctoring» - a PR strategy giving news the desired direction of interpretation.

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Speaking of former Yugoslav republics, the Slovenians had the most up-to-date equipment and perfectly organized their information headquarters into communes with more than 150 people working day and night.

At the proposal of the Croatian Diaspora in America, Ruder & Finn, a Washington – based PR agency, was hired in Croatia for a \$10,000 appanage a month, plus costs between August 1991 to June 1992.

Prior to war in BiH, the Bosnian lobby hired the two most powerful PR agencies: Hill and Knowlton and Ruder & Finn Global Public Affairs. A monthly appanage for planning certain activities of Ruder & Finn cost \$18,000. Placing information independently depending on the effect was paid for every news. A campaign on death camps in Bosnia officially cost \$480.000.

Estimates show that the separatist movement in Kosmet annually earmarked up to 60 million convertible marks for its media presentation engaging some 150 of its journalists in Kosmet and over 100 journalists in the West. Support to extreme movements also comes from PR teams in the Albanian Diaspora, which form the public opinion in the West and are even backed by foreign governments as in the case of NAAC (NATIONAL ALBANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL). The NAAC includes people like William Walker, other celebrities and diplomats.

In that context, the Serbs, the people of Serbia and the citizens of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were constantly sacrificed by a provincial regime of political improvisers¹ on the one hand and satanized by the enemy on the other hand. Not only did this have an effect on public, social and private lives but was also one of the leading cards to the creators of the informative intervention and propaganda war in these areas and a sore point of media activities.

An information war is part of war dimensions. It is an offensive and defensive use of information and information systems aiming to use, bribe, ruin and destroy information and information systems of the enemy concurrently protecting personal information and systems. Researches differentiate three aspects in that war: to get information; to prevent someone else from reaching the information; to make others reach false information. This third aspect regards disinformation

¹ In the meantime, four powers were formed in the FR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Srpska, which later on grow into mafia structures of pyramidal character closely connected with the same structures among Muslims, Croats and Albanians. In effort to permanently be in power in Serbia and Montenegro, Slobodan Milosevic allowed and succeeded to form an army of the hundred most influential members of economic, intellectual and security "elite" between 1991 and 2000 regardless of political and ideological affiliation. This oligarchic structure depended on the criminal underground to a great extent. An excuse for their actions and existence was the protection of national interests although they all found (not only Milosevic's Party) alternative crisis suitable for it was the only way to preserve and camouflage the provincial regime of political improvisers. Clashes between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs were actually a clash between the political and criminal underground of two feudal lords, Karadzic and Milosevic, who, by giving the green light for ethnic cleansing in Krajina and a substantial reduction in the territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic, won the title of the "factor of stability and piece in the Balkans" according to Holbrooke.

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and impact on opinion and attitudes. The importance of media and information war becomes the primary doctrine of the national defense of the 21st century and its key argument. Information weapons in America's military doctrine of the 21st century are seen as the basic element of the so-called "doctrine of the targeted power".

It is this fact that has made disinformation a powerful weapon in activating the foreign policy of a country in crisis areas. And when the "real" information was scanty to achieve success, disinformation was used as a basic and strategic means of manipulation, a means of creating the public opinion or pressuring the centers of power to take action unjustified both legally and internationally. This is why psychological manipulations matter that much. They are placed through the media and they bring prestigious journalism awards, reputation and high fees. It is the secret operations budget of powerful intelligence systems that often covers the costs.

During "special operations" secret services use strategic disinformation and a wide range of world information obtained through a global network, the Esalon system. Much information and a number of analyses during the Cold War were obtained by the secret services through a network of agents, intelligent officers and associates working in the field through an "in-depth" analysis. The last decade of the 20th century gave the powerful a chance to benefit from a sophisticated technology thus reducing the fieldwork. This appeared to be an obvious weakness in the Balkans in the fight against global terrorism and war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

For the governments and their own promotion, the secret services created the world's information war, which is today governed by them. Among the activities they are in charge of is also the "making" of an event and information or "creative disinformation". Once the most important part of the police, today all kinds of intelligent officers are just a service for skilled experts on psychological war produce information on their own. The information must be as truthful as to have at least one "word" of ours in the entire text. Everything else is the truth that can be checked. Ninety-five percent of the truth has the best effect, i.e. five percent of lies in a text. The secret services create information that contains less 50% of the truth. This is made for the first reaction or "a preventive attack" that creates the public opinion and stimulates a country and politics to react.

How can we then define the role of the governments and secret services in an attempt to globally define "the information – informative order" in the world, particularly in the areas critical to the national interests of powerful states rather than tactical, operative and conceptual.

- tactically – disorganizes the governing of a state or some parts of its vital activity
- operatively – forcing the government to take inappropriate decisions
- strategically - freezing the information and intellectual resources of a country
- conceptually – disorientation and paralysis of the social awareness

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Special strength to such a network of power – the power of the governments – secret services – military management, is fueled by the media and journalists that become “virtual” or “civil” soldiers doing the job with their laptops, satellite phones and cameras as part of the military machinery. Seeing that over 150 wars have been waged since 1945, it is clear that the role of journalism is not only a business but also a national and security mechanism. It can therefore be stated that “War is probably the most efficient machine used to wash and recycle carriers and businesses”. There are “Don Quixote” journalists trying to resist the power of a state and its intelligence machinery, but the number is, in essence, irrelevantly small. It is important to bear in mind that during the past twelve years, 1,192 journalists and media workers have been killed, 80 of whom died during the Balkan conflict since the start of the breakup of former Yugoslavia in 1991.

News and information are trade above all, while ethics is in the background. Business is brisk in war-hit areas. The sale of media contents – news especially about crisis events during the past decade of the 20th century became quite a profitable venture. Some information and media contents shaped into news for media campaigns and the governments of the countries taking part in the clashes cost a lot for they affected the governments’ decisions and “special operations” of the secret services which were cashing in on information in the news or electronic media to perform their preventive operations“ or “humanitarian interventions”.

News about war was the most popular. It was both in favor of military cabinets and secret services. It triggered the preventive policies of the countries interested in the Balkans clashes. On the other hand, selective information, i.e. disinformation sold dearly. The information was a media response to the intents of the “underground diplomacy” and the military industry.

A question is raised about relations between espionage and journalism. The relations between espionage and journalism remind of the game “man don’t get angry”, which makes you come full circle when someone reveals a discovery or news. The circle is totally perverted. The discovery can come from any of intelligence officers but just when the unchecked rumor is published, it becomes “news”. If the news draws politicians’ attention, it causes polemics meaning that the turmoil has already begun. Modern systems of espionage and information control raise the question of the depth of the governments’ and secret services’ activities aimed at controlling the informative and information field.

Campaign: aimed at the Serbian side during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has a couple of various phases:

- The theme for the first phase is “barbaric annihilation of civilians and objects by “aggressive” Serbian forces. Culmination of reports on this subject was the incident on Vase Miskina Street. This event directly lead to the implementation of sanctions against the Serbian Republic (SRJ) on May 29th, 1992.

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- The second phase consists of stories about Serbian “concentration camps”. Parallel was drawn with the Nazi concentration camps.
- Third phase includes stories as well as “ testimonies from a large number of Muslim women who were raped and placed in special camps for sexual abuse”
- In the forth phase a verdict was passed against the Serbs for “ethnic cleansing” against the Muslims within the “occupied territories”
- The fifth phase was represented as “agonized” cities with mostly Muslims which were besieged; the message passed was “In the name of God do something”.
- In the sixth phase “reports on executions of Muslim prisoners and the search for mass graves are most dominant. However during the whole time there were stories with other themes as well.

During the crisis in Yugoslavia the media, instead of trying to direct public opinion toward peace with their reports or offer confirmed information they did their best in increasing prejudices especially when they forgot that all conceivable crimes, which occurred on all sides, should be individualized and not generalized.

The Canadian General Louis McKenzie, the first commander of the UN Peace Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated in June of '92: The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have long been over if the Muslim leaders would stop killing their own people for the sake of CNN. There are still suspicions that the massacre which took place on Vase Miskina Street was the beginning of one type of “Muslim auto-terrorism” whose goal was to reach out and touch the international public as well as punish the Serbs with military intervention, as had occurred in the end. All this was done in a timely manner, so as to destroy the peace talks in Lisbon.

The explosion which occurred on the Sarajevo market Markale on 5/2/1994 when 68 people died and 197 were wounded, as well as the explosion in Trgovacka St. in Sarajevo on 28/8/1995 when 37 people lost their lives and 85 wounded were provoked by the Muslims and were aimed at evoking anger within the international community toward the Serbian people, in addition they needed to justify the bombing which took place on two occasions: on April 10/11th in 1994 near Gorazde and in August of '95. At the same time, the Croatian offensive was initiated in the western part of the Serbian Republic- at the Bosnian border.

The stories about the raped Muslim women were timed so that they appeared prior to the Edinburgh summit which took place on December 11th, 1992. It all started with rumors, and continued with official reports regarding the 20 -60 thousand Muslim women who were raped by Serbs. In the end, the UN committee found that 2, 400 women were victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they belonged to all three ethnic groups (Serbs, Muslims and Croats), based on 119 reported incidents, while the UN Security Council questioned 223 victims who recalled 4, 500 rape incidents, also from all three ethnic groups.

International media simply ignored the photographs of mujahidin found in Jasenovci on the Crni Vrh, in September of 1992, which showed Serbian soldiers with their heads cut off. Almost

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everyone was trying to minimize the effect of Islamizing in Bosnia and maximizing the “crimes committed by the Serbia aggressors”. It is true that during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 618 mosques were completely destroyed of which many were of priceless historic, architectural and artistic value, but no one ever published a photo of the remains of Saborna Church in Mostar. A magnificent church, which loomed over the city, was leveled to the ground in the spring of 1992. The world also kept quiet about the Zitomistic Monastery, and all the other sacred Serbian buildings throughout the former Yugoslavia, including Krka, Krupa, Zocista Monastery and the medieval places of worship which were under the protection of UNESCO. The total number of destroyed buildings in the Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia includes 333, plus another 474 churches and Monasteries which were damaged. A comparison can be made with Kosovo, where 200 mosques (from the 607 which existed) were destroyed during the Kosovo Crisis and especially during the bombing which took place in Kosovo, yet since the arrival of KFOR in that region there have been 107 Serbian orthodox churches destroyed and damaged.

The stories about concentration camps in which Serbs held Muslims captive (in locations such as Banja Luka, Cepeljine, Foce, Bijelins, Brcko, Bosanska Gradiska) were initiated by the US newspapers led by the New York Times and their key interest was, as confirmed by the agencies chiefs Rudder and Finn, to win favor of the powerful Jewish lobby. Simultaneously at the margins of the international press there was information published about 394 concentration camps and jails which existed in 181 locations in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs were being held captive. When mentioning Sarajevo no one mentioned that there were approximately 12 000 Serbian victims which means that 7.6% of the Serbian population in Sarajevo lost their lives, while 150 000 fled from this city, and another 50 000 were jailed. The same goes for 1, 500 missing Serbs, Muslims, Goranacs, Gypsies and other citizens for which it is assumed that 695 of that are in concentration camps and jails located in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo.

There is no controversy over the fact that when Srebrenica the captured soldiers who were members of the Muslim Eight operative group, who committed great atrocities against the Serbian people since the war broke out in eastern Bosnia, but there was no genocide or systematic killings of the enemy. Srebrenica was the turning point of the war in Bosnia, because that was a media event. There were no journalists on the spot. Hundreds of them ran off to near by Tuzla, where they interviewed and taped the Srebrenica refugees. The 2 082 corpses, which have been up until now exhumed and found, under the care of the Hag tribunal investigators, is constantly being tripled, so that despite all the evidence it is being quoted as 7 333 missing. Today many other questions remain open: Why is it kept quiet that in the war of 1995, 500 Serbs died during the breach of the 28 Muslim Division. Why do non profit organizations which are responsible for humanitarian rights not mention the 1 260 Serb civilians which lost their lives

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to the Naser Oric squadrom from Srebrenica. Is it true that, as evidence shows Srebrenica was consciously sacrificed by the Muslims but maximally used by the media?

In the next phase of the Yugoslav Crisis, during the time that the “Kosovo issue” was being resolved the media might have had an opportunity to play their real role and add light to the situation. However we all found ourselves (Serbians and Albanians alike) in a mosaic of misunderstandings: on the one hand the fact that the Balkan actors are not offering their definition of national interest, nor a projection of realistic and effective multilateral approach, instead of that they are repeating the folkloristic stereotype, and on the other the fact that the observers from the outside are not familiar with the micro encirclement. Both sides, the Serbian and Albanian, were successful in creating a wall of self-imposed isolation considering that they are insisting on selfish macro dimensional presentation instead of micro-dimensional analysis, so that questions without answers go in favor of outside forces and third parties which plan to intervene as “mediators” instead of rationally creating mutual trust and understanding.

In all tense situations in Kosovo, it was difficult and almost impossible to create a clear difference between criminal and political activities. It turned out the most energy was invested into propaganda against the OVK and the Albanian movement which contributed to the increase in their popularity. The impression is given that the Serbian propaganda has most contributed to lifting the veil of secrecy over the OVK and its development into a public political factor, not only so in Kosovo. Quite likely it is this that was the deciding factor in popularizing the OVK among the Kosovo Albanians. OVK was not even mentioned in the Albanian media, so the Serbian propaganda achieved an adverse effect.

The fact that the radicalization of the Kosovo situation was wished for by the radical Islamic movement was hidden, evident in the incident at North Kavkaza in Russia, where the government was trying to eliminate Vahabits and their movement which was aiming to move their center of activities to North Albania and Kosovo. Starting then the Saudi Arab circles have supported the OVK, some individuals were given the right to support the OVK financially, and the Islam extremists where able to take part in military activities of the organization.

The Serbian side was completely blocked by a disreputable oligarch scared off by someone on the outside, which used the Kosovo issue to protect their authority by improvising and repeating the same questions from the period of the Bosnian crisis. The media war against Serbia including the tolerance of the separatist terrorism was developed through the same media models and stereotypes as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia:

- Development of theory that Serbia “ethnically cleansing” and the plan “Big Serbia” right on its own territory
- Yugoslav Military and Ministry of Internal Affairs are held responsible, which in turn makes the Republic of Serbia’s’ sovereignty questionable

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- In the media, as “Srebrenica incident” was used so were “Drenica incident” and “Racak incident”. Until it fell, Srebrenica was an important Islam bastion and information base for the US. Drenica is the central base for the separatist terrorism and Racak one of the UCK centers. With use of Drenica, the myth about UCK was created, and if it wasn't for Racak, the air campaign against Yugoslavia would have never taken place
- Scenes were created of the “exodus” of the Albanians, who left their villages under the pressure of the UCK terrorists, as did Serbs because of fear and reprisal

During the aggression on Yugoslavia. The NATO forces influenced all media centers and they were aiming toward two goals: Elimination of the possibility of the Yugoslav public being informed, which would cause an increase in their feelings of insecurity and panic, as well as opening up the possibility of propagandist influence of the aggressor forces through their own information sources.

The end of journalism and objective crisis reporting. This did not only happen during the Yugoslav crisis, for on April 23rd, 1999 at 2:06 am NATO forced attacked 16 employees of the Radio-Television Serbia media center. Our colleagues were written off and sacrificed political subjects in Belgrade, executed by NATO. Those who ordered the bombing and those who did nothing to protect their employees are to blame. At the sound of the air raid alarm all were to be hidden, yet in that building there was no bomb shelter. After all no one was hurt when the Novi Sad Television building was leveled to the ground.

Strategy of the “new informative-informational and media system”, talks more and more about virtual journalism, virtual wars, virtual defense, virtual rivals and virtual cyber criminal and terrorism which noticeably rocking the national strategy of powerful countries through a “background” war by disturbing strategic systems which are based on the global network and superb information systems. The Western rivals have created a new type of special war which was continued with the terrorist influence of AL KAIIDA who has confirmed the existence of mega-terrorism with the use of the virtual network as the AL KAIADA database and new media networks which have replaced CNN as the AL DZAZIR TV station.

One less familiar fact regarding the Kosovo crisis and the so called Albanian cyber terrorism is that the Albanians had 1,500 sites on the internet (and they have more related to ANA), of which most were masked by electronic stations of various humanitarian organizations, which are followed by the Arab and Islamic population. Basically there were three databases used for the Albanian cyber terrorism, one in Kosovo, another in the US and the last in Germany. In the beginning the most popular site was the UCK from Croatia. In addition to the 1,500 Albanian sites there are at least 10 times more internet substations in support of them. Therefore the Albanian terrorists had at least 15, 000 sites for propaganda of their ideas of political violence. The Americans and Europeans refer to Albanian terrorism on the Internet as hackerism, which minimizes the danger from OVK and their successors, ANA and ONA. The reason for the

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tolerance toward sites with terrorist messages ANA, is the close collaboration between some western countries and their secret agencies with Albanian terrorists. They use ANA for destabilization of the Balkans and Southern Europe.

An interesting fact is that similar methods were used and are still being used by terrorists from the Chechnya separatist movement whose internet's websites are being inter-connected and are functionals throughout various links. Instantly there are 20 active sites. Almost each chechen leader has his personal website such as are Alsan Mashadov, Movladi Udugov, Jandarbijev, Ahmadov and available is also the internet address of the so called "Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Ickeria". The most active and popular web site in Europe is KAVKAZ CENTER. The most known "chechen cyber-terrorist" in western Europe is Sajid- Magomed Hacukajev.

In accordance with the decision of the Association for coordination of foreign policy in Lithuania, whose country president is Roland Pinks, the Chechnya separatist internet site KAVKAZ-CENTER was closed down. At the press conference the Lithuania POCJ counterintelligence representative announced that the site was linked to propaganda of terrorism and promoting national differences. Considering that the international terrorists and their leader Osama Bin Laden finance various numbers of informational programs and projects, analysts believe that parts of these resources were on the bank accounts of the KAVKAZ-CENTER.

It is obvious that the future of the representative of the "7th force" in crisis and war situations are between a soldier and a private eye in other words between a "secret" warrior who across the global network and "hacking" system create information within the boundaries of "informative-media-intervention" and "virtual-real war". Journalists are more often becoming "virtual" commentators, informers or cameramen who use new informational technologies and capabilities. It is in this context which raises the question for future conflict-wars, media and the role of journalists as well as those who work on prevention and those who lead the information war with visible consequences. There is an increase in modern journalists and analysts who sit in front of their powerful computers and programs, and are in a position to create media content required for crisis situation. Furthermore this raises a question whether the wars of the 21st century are initiated in cyber space at the border between information and politics. If the opponents target is related to information technology and info structure and the only weapon is a computer virus no one will know that the war will continue until it's over. This type of war will represent a challenge for persistence and media attention. Future wars will be completely unnoticed by journalists and bystanders.

In every war the first sacrifice is the truth, but in a virtual war the media creates an illusion that what we are seeing is the truth.

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